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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The possible alternatives cloud the key consideration-the people.
It will be a difficult choice when the housing decision-makers determine the trade-off between the rights of these people to a safe and
habitable dwelling, and putting financial onus on the landlord, risking
abandonment and new slums, or increased government largess.
James Kevin Checkett

MANUFACTURERS' PRODUCTS LAmBUTY-THE OKLAHomA SUPREME
COURT CONSIDERS THE COMPETENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVI-

DENCE IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION.
Stores, Inc., 541 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1975).

Green v. Safeway

In April of 1974, the Oklahoma Supreme Court pointed out in
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.' that manufacturers' products liability was a separate and independent cause of action standing on its
own. The court also made it clear that inferences from circumstantial
evidence, which is the core of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, are no
less applicable to strict liability in tort. It specifically decreed that a
plaintiff may prove his cause of action for manufacturers' products liability by circumstantial evidence and proper inferences drawn therefrom since actual or absolute proof of a defect in a sophisticated product may be within the peculiar knowledge or possession of the defend2
ant.
One year later, in Green v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,' the court considered whether the plaintiff had produced competent circumstantial
evidence to support a theory of recovery in manufacturers' products liability and found that the trial court had erred in failing to sustain the
defendant's demurrer to the evidence and request for a directed verdict
as there was no evidence tending to reasonably support the judgment
trolled at the local level. See C. DOXIAsis, URBAN REAwL AND TIm FUTURE op Tm
AmEaicAN Crry 154-61 (1966).
1. 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
2. Id. at 1363.
3. 541 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1975).
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for the plaintiff.4
In Green, plaintiff purchased a carton containing Seven-Up at the
defendant's store. She left the store carrying the carton by its handle,
crossed the street and was waiting for a traffic signal when she heard
a pop, felt a sting, looked down and saw that she was cut and bleeding.
The plaintiff testified that she did not misuse the carton, swing the carton, or do anything that would cause the bottle to fall. The carton itself
was not introduced into evidence. Trial was had prior to the promulgation of Kirkland and the case was submitted to the jury under theories
of negligence and breach of implied warranty. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff and on assignment to the court of appeals the
judgment was affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court, the majority
opinion applied the principles of manufacturers' products liability as
enunciated in Kirkland.5
In reversing the judgment, the court emphasized that strict liability, in itself, does not prove the plaintiff's case and cited Kirkland
for the proposition "that the injury is not of itself proof of the defect,
or that the proof of the injury shifts the burden to the defendant."
The court noted that the plaintiff still had the burden of establishing
first, that the product caused the injury and second, that a defect existed in the product, if the action is against the retailer, at the time
of sale for public use.7 The majority opinion in Green agreed that the
plaintiff had failed to carry this burden and concluded that there was
no competent evidence whatsoever, direct, circumstantial or otherwise
to sustain an action in products liability. Underlying this conclusion,
the court appeared to be saying that the bare fact that an accident happens to a product is not sufficient proof that it was in any way defective.
The dissent, while acknowledging that proof of the injury is not
4. Id. at 203.
5. Id. at 202. Although the decision in Kirkland was prospective, the court there
held that it "may. . .be applied by the appellate courts in cases which have been tried
and are for decision on appeal where it would not prejudice the rights of the litigants."
521 P.2d at 1368.
6. 541 P.2d at 202.
7. Id. To recover under manufacturers' products liability, the plaintiff must also
prove that the defect made the article unreasonably dangerous to him or to his property.
However, in the Green case, proof of this element was not at issue.
8. Id. at 203. The majority also held, in this connection, that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur could not be invoked until, as a preliminary proposition, the plaintiff established what caused the injury. They held further that the doctrine could not be invoked because it was not presented to the trial court nor relied upon by plaintiff on
appeal to sustain the judgment of the trial court.
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proof of the defect, 9 argued that inferences from other proved facts
should have been sufficient to support a finding of all the essential elements prescribed by Kirkland.10 It relied on Kirkland for the proposition that a plaintiff may prove his cause of action in manufacturers'
products liability by circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom." The court stated in Kirkland:
[M]ore than likely Plaintiff may be forced to rely on circumstances and proper inferences drawn therefrom in making his
proof. . . . [I]n some accidents the surrounding circumstances and human experience should make Plaintiff's burden
less arduous ....
12
The dissenting opinion in Green claimed that a beverage bottle
falling from a carton while it is being handled normally is exactly the
type of accident which does not ordinarily occur without a defect.' 8
Consequently, proof that the carton caused the injury and proof that
the carton was defective should have been inferred from the uncontradicted facts describing how the accident happened. The dissent also
contended that the plaintiff adequately established that the defect was
in the carton at the time it was sold by Safeway. By alleging that she
exercised proper care of the carton, Mrs. Green eliminated her own
improper use as an equally probable cause for the injury. By accounting for the small time lapse between the sale and the accident, she discounted the possibility that the carton was subjected to any harmful intermediate handling 4 or that the defect resulted from long continuous
use.

15

The reasoning of the dissent appears to conform to the proposition
in Kirkland that a plaintiff may prove his cause of action in manufac9. Id. at 207.
10. Id. The dissent contended there was sufficient evidence to submit the case to
the jury under any theory, i.e. negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability.
11. Id. at 206.
12. 521 P.2d at 1363-64 (emphasis in original).
13. 541 P.2d at 207-08. Justice Hodges stated:
It is common knowledge that just as a chair leg does not ordinarily break
causing a fall which results in injury, neither does a carton designed and
extensively used to transport soft drinks ordinarily collapse permitting bottles
to fall to the ground causing injury, if those in control thereof have exercised
proper care.
-14. IdThe dissenting justices-concluded that "[t]here- was sufficienF-showing that
the time lapse was too small to permit the carton to be subjected to any extraneous
harmful force or that it was mishandled while in the hands of the plaintiff."
15. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MInN. L. Rav. 791, 845 n.282. The
author there cites several cases to support the statement that "[it has been said a good
many times that the seller does not undertake to provide a product that will not wear
OUt."

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 15
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I11

turers' products liability by inferences from circumstantial evidence.
The majority while citing Kirkland, declined to apply it as authority to
support Mrs. Green's theory for recovery. This refusal is interesting
in view of Justice Doolin's zealous introductory statement in Kirkland:
The issue for us in this case is the present and the future of
products liability litigation in Oklahoma. Much we do in this
case may set the pattern of such litigation in Oklahoma and
may determine whether this young, vigorous and progressive
State shall now meet the challenge of the mass advertising of
today, its hypnosis, and the pace and flow of the economics of
the late twentieth century.' 6
It appears, from an analysis of the approach taken in the Green
opinion, that the court's enthusiasm for products liability may be on the
wane. Since a lawyer will seldom be able to produce actual or absolute proof that a defective product caused injury to the plaintiff, refusal
to allow reliance on circumstantial evidence is bound to significantly
reduce the number of actions based on this theory.
Daniel J. Boudreau
16. 521 P.2d at 1356.
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